ABSTRACT In this paper, we investigate the secure transmission for differential quadrature spatial modulation (DQSM) with artificial noise (AN) in multiple-input single-output wiretap networks, where a cooperative jammer helps the secure transmission between transceivers in the presence of an eavesdropper. To evaluate the secrecy performance of the DQSM with AN in the considered wiretap networks, assuming Rayleigh fading, we derive exact and asymptotic closed-form expressions for secrecy outage probability and effective secrecy throughput under two practical scenarios, i.e., Scenario I, where the eavesdropper is passive and its channel state information (CSI) is unavailable, and Scenario II, where the eavesdropper is active and its CSI is available. Finally, numerical simulations demonstrate that increasing the transmit power of transmitter or cooperative jammer can improve the secrecy performance, but too large transmit power at the transmitter or cooperative jammer is not helpful. Moreover, increasing the number of antennas at the transmitter or cooperative jammer brings up better secrecy performance.
I. INTRODUCTION
Security and privacy protection is an increasingly important issue in the design and implementation of wireless networks, due to the broadcast nature of the wireless medium. Traditional security approaches employ cryptographic algorithms to achieve communication confidentiality and authentication [1] . However, with the development of the computation techniques, the traditional security approaches can be deciphered at vicious nodes. To cope with this problem, physical layer security (PLS) has been receiving growing attention within the past decade [2] . Unlike complex encryption-based security [3] , PLS methods exploit differences in channel conditions to boost signal reception at intended recipients while degrading the reception of unauthorized users [4] , [5] .
In order to improve the security of information transmission, some techniques were proposed in the pioneer works, for example, multi-antenna technique [6] , [7] , artificial noise technique [8] , [9] , and cooperative jamming technique [10] . Specifically, multi-antenna technique can provide extra spatial degrees of freedom and has been considered as an efficient and reliable way for improving security [11] . In parallel, AN technique is also a meaningful idea to improve the secrecy performance of wireless communications in PLS. The key of AN lies in sending noise signals in the null space of the legitimate user's channel to deliberately interfere with the eavesdropper's reception [12] . Based on AN technique, the authors of [10] explored cooperative jamming to further enhance security for transmission. However, all the above techniques are not well suited for the network with low-complexity device [13] . On the other hand, spatial modulation (SM) has been proposed as a low complexity spectral efficiency enhancing technique for the reduction of radio frequency (RF)-chains in conventional multipleinput multiple-output (MIMO) systems [14] - [16] . Specifically, SM exhibits several advantages such as simpler receiver and transmitter [17] , lower transmit power consumption [18] , and better power amplifier efficiency [19] . Considering the above advantages, it has been expected to be one of the key technologies for spectrum and energy-efficient 5G wireless networks [20] . In SM techniques, the information bits are partitioned into two parts, of which one modulates the symbol and the other activates one out of all transmit antennas. The key limitation of the above AN and cooperative jamming techniques is that there is only one transmit antenna is active at each time slot. Therefore, they cannot be directly employed in SM communication systems.
Inspired by this, for SM communication systems, Wang et al. [21] equipped the transmitter with more than one activated RF-chains and applied jamming methods to protect secret information. In this strategy, additional transmission power was needed at transmitter to emit jamming signals. In [22] and [23] , the precoding techniques were applied to enhance secrecy communications, and the precoder was optimized by jointly minimizing the power received by the eavesdropper and maximizing the power received by the legitimate user. Jiang et al. proposed a new secrecy enhancement scheme in [24] for SM systems by exploiting the knowledge of the legitimate channel state information (CSI) to rotate the indices of the transmit antennas and the constellation symbols, which are mapped into spatial and constellation bits.
Recently, differential quadrature spatial modulation (DQSM) was proposed to enhance the spectral efficiency and alleviate the requirement of channel knowledge at the receiver while retaining all the inherent advantages of SM [25] - [27] . The DQSM technique has been demonstrated to outperform conventional multi-antenna techniques in terms of hardware complexity [20] , [27] , e.g., it can be implemented with single RF-chain transmitter, and the receiver don't need to perform complicated baseband signal processing to estimate the CSI. However, to the best of the authors' knowledge, there has been no research on the secure transmission for DQSM so far.
Motivated by the above, we investigate the problem of secure transmission for DQSM communication networks in this paper. Specifically, we concentrate on multipleinput single-output (MISO) wiretap networks, where a multi-antenna transmitter transmits secret messages to a single-antenna receiver in the presence of a single-antenna eavesdropper. Besides, there is a multi-antenna cooperative jammer that emits jamming signals to prevent the eavesdropper from retrieving the secret messages. Based on the eavesdropper's different working methods, we consider two practical scenarios, i.e., Scenario I where the eavesdropper is passive and its CSI is unavailable (No Eve's CSI), and Scenario II where the eavesdropper is an active user in the system and its full CSI is available (Eve's full CSI). The main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows: The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section II, we describe the system model and introduce the transmission process of DQSM communication. Section III derives the exact expressions for SOP and EST and conducts an asymptotic analysis in high SNR regime. The numerical results and discussions are presented in section IV. Finally, conclusions are stated in section V.
NOTATION
Matrices and column vectors are denoted by uppercase and lowercase boldface letters, respectively. A complex Gaussian random variable x with zero mean and unit variance is denoted as x ∼ CN (0, 1). An exponent-distributed random variable y with parameter a is denoted as y ∼ exp (a). The set of all n-dimensional complex vectors is denoted by C n . 
II. SYSTEM MODEL
As illustrated in Fig.1 , we consider a MISO wiretap network, in which a single RF-chain transmitter (Alice) with N T -antennas serves a single-antenna receiver (Bob) in the presence of a single-antenna eavesdropper (Eve) [10] , [29] , where N T ≥ 2. In this network, a cooperative jammer (Charlie) with N J -antennas emits interference signals to confuse the detection at Eve, where N J ≥ 2. The channel vectors of Alice to Bob link and Alice to Eve link are denoted by h AB ∈ C N T and h AE ∈ C N T , respectively. The channel vectors of Charlie to Bob link and Charlie to Eve link are denoted by g CB ∈ C N J and g CE ∈ C N J , respectively. Without loss of generality, the following assumptions are adopted in this paper: 1) all the channels are assumed to be quasi-static independent Rayleigh fading channels, where the fading coefficients are constant during the N T time instants in a transmission block and vary from one block to another, 2) the channel coefficients can be obtained by Alice and Charlie when Bob transmits messages to Alice [30] , [31] , 3) if the Eve is passive, the channel vector g CE is unavailable, while it is available if the Eve is an active user in the system [30] .
Different from conventional MIMO schemes, DQSM has inherent advantages on hardware complexity [20] , [27] , e.g., it can be implemented with single RF-chain transmitter, and the receiver don't need to estimate the CSI. The DQSM scheme activates two transmit antennas at most at each time instant to maintain single RF-chain transmitter. Specifically, a single transmit antenna is active to transmit the real part of the complex symbol and another or the same antenna to transmit the imaginary part of the data symbol [26] , [27] . When the real part and the imaginary part of the complex symbol are transmitted by the same antenna, there is only one antenna is activated. So the artificial noise scheme cannot work at the transmitter. Therefore, to enhance the security level of the considered network, a cooperative jammer is employed to emit AN signals in attempt to reduce the received signal-tointerference-plus-noise-ratio (SINR) at the Eve. Specifically, the transmission process is detailed as follows:
In DQSM scheme, secret signals are transmitted in the form of N T × N T space-time block S, which is constituted with signal vectors in N T time instants. The (m, t)th entry of S denotes the symbol s mt transmitted via the mth transmit antenna at time instant t. We assume that the real and imaginary parts of the complex signal symbol used by DQSM have equal energy, for example DQSM with 4-QAM modulation in [27] . Given that Alice transmits the tth block S t ∈ C N T ×N T , it can be expressed as S t = S t + S t , where S t and S t denote the real and imaginary matrices, respectively. Considering S t and S t individually, only one antenna remains active at each time instant, and each antenna is activated once in the N T successive time instants of each space-time block. That is to say, only one entry in any column or any row of S † t , † ∈ { , }, is nonzero [25] , [27] .
During the duration of tth transmission block, the jamming signal matrix emitted by Charlie is denoted by 
where n B,t and n E,t respectively represent 1 × N T additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) vectors at Bob and Eve during the duration of the block. Now, we examine the received SINRs at Bob and Eve under the two considered scenarios.
1) NO EVE'S CSI
In many practical scenarios, the eavesdropper is passive [32] , [33] . It is difficult to obtain any information about the passive Eve's CSI, or it may even be impractical to assume that the system is aware of the presence of an Eve at all. In such case, the isotropic AN is often used. Charlie nulls out the interference toward Bob when emitting jamming signals. With the help of [10] , we can construct z i during each time instant as
where
is an orthonormal basis for null g H CB , P J denotes the transmit power of Charlie, z c,i ∈ C N J −1 is a Gaussian noise vector with distribution CN 0,I N J −1 . The transmit power of Charlie is equally assigned to N J − 1 entries of z c,i , since Eve's perfect CSI is not available.
With this in mind, we first present the received SINRs at Bob and Eve under Scenario I in the following lemma.
Lemma 1: When Eve's CSI is unavailable, the received SINRs at Bob and Eve are expressed as
where ρ = N J − 1, P T denotes the transmit power of Alice, and σ 2 B and σ 2 E are the variances of AWGN at Bob and Eve, respectively.
Proof: See Appendix A.
2) EVE'S FULL CSI
This assumption is valid for the scenario where Eve is also an active user of the system, possibly for different security required services. In such case, Charlie can estimate the CSI of wiretap channel from the active Eve's transmission [30] , [31] . Charlie sends weighted jamming signals to Eve. We adopt the zero-forcing beamforming algorithm to avoid the undesirable jamming signals at Bob [34] . Now, using the projection matrix theory [35] , the optimal weight vector can be obtained as
where g ⊥ CB = I − g CB g H CB / g H CB g CB is the projection idempotent matrix with rank N J − 1. Therefore, during each time instant, the transmitted artificial noise vector by Charlie, z i , can be constructed as
where z i is a Gaussian noise variable with distribution CN (0, 1). In Scenario II, the SINR at Bob is the same as that in (4), and the SINR at Eve is given in the following lemma.
Lemma 2: When Eve's full CSI is available, the received SINR at Eve is expressed as
Proof: Following the similar procedure as in the proof of Lemma 1, the desired result can be obtained.
Then, we define C B log 2 (1 + γ B ) and C * E log 2 (1 + γ * E ) as the main channel capacity and the wiretap channel capacity, respectively, where * ∈ {I, II}. Therefore, the achievable secrecy rate of the considered network is given by
. For simplicity, we define γ B = P T /σ 2 B , γ E = P T /σ 2 E , and γ J = P J /σ 2 E .
III. SECRECY PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we first derive exact and asymptotic closedform expressions for the SOP of the MISO wiretap network under the two scenarios. Based on the expressions, we then evaluate the EST of the considered network.
A. PRELIMINARIES
From equation (4), we find that γ B follows a Chi-squared distribution since h AB 2 is a sum of the squares of N T independent Gaussian random variables [36] . We obtain the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of γ B as
Now, we examine the probability density function (PDF) of γ * E , * ∈ {I, II}. First, we consider the scenario with No Eve's CSI. We firstly define ξ =
in (5). Then, we can obtain the PDF of ξ as
With the help of [37] , the PDF of ψ I is given by
The CDF of γ I E is derived as
Then we take derivative of (12) to obtain the PDF of γ I E as
By substituting (10) and (11) into (13) Lemma 3: When Eve's CSI is unavailable, the PDF of SINR at Eve is expressed as
. (14) Then, considering the scenario with Eve's full CSI. We firstly define ψ II = γ J g H CE w zf 2 in (8), with the help of [38] , the PDF of ψ II is
According to (8) , (10) and (15) , the PDF of γ II E can be derived in the following lemma.
Lemma 4: When Eve's full CSI is available, the PDF of SINR at Eve is expressed as
B. SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY
The secrecy outage probability is defined as the probability that the achievable secrecy rate C S is lower than a predefined secrecy transmission rate R S . Mathematically, it is expressed as
where * ∈ {I, II}. Now, we present the SOPs of the considered network in different scenarios.
1) NO EVE'S CSI
By substituting (9) and (14) into (17) and performing mathematical manipulations, we have
Letting t = N T γ J ργ E y and applying [28, eq. (9.211.4)], we derive the exact closed-form expression for the SOP under the scenario with No Eve's CSI in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: When Eve's CSI is unavailable, the SOP of the considered network is given as
2) EVE'S FULL CSI
By substituting (9) and (16) into (17) and applying [28, eq. (9.211.4)], the closed-form expression for the SOP under the scenario II is derived in the following theorem. Theorem 2: When Eve's full CSI is available, the SOP of the considered network is given as
Remark 1: According to Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, the closed-form expressions for the SOP are presented, which provide an efficient means to evaluate the impact of different system parameters on the secrecy performance of the network. Comparing (19) and (20), we can find that the SOP under the scenario with Eve's full CSI is lower than that under the scenario with No Eve's CSI. However, the derived expressions are in general complicated to gain more insights. Hence, in the following, we analyze the asymptotic secrecy outage probability.
C. ASYMPTOTIC BEHAVIOUR
Now, we focus on the asymptotic analysis about the SOP in high SNR regime. Specifically, two separate situations are studied: 1) P T → ∞ and fixed P J , which is a situation where the transmit power of transmitter goes to infinite and that of cooperative jammer is constant, 2) P J → ∞ and fixed P T , which is a situation where the transmit power of jammer goes to infinite and that of transmitter is constant.
1) P T → ∞ AND FIXED P J
Corollary 1: When Eve's CSI is unavailable, the SOP under P T → ∞ and fixed P J can be approximated as
Proof: See Appendix B. Corollary 2: When Eve's full CSI is available, the SOP under P T → ∞ and fixed P J can be approximated as
Proof: Following similar procedure as in the proof of Corollary 1, the desired result can be obtained from (20) .
Remark 2: It is observed that the asymptotic SOPs under the two considered scenarios are nonzero constants, which indicates that the SOPs will not approach zero even increasing transmit power unboundedly. Therefore, too large transmit power of Alice is not helpful to the secrecy performance, because the channel quality difference between the main channel and the wiretap channel will finally become the bottleneck for the SOP and dominate the error floor for the SOP.
2) P J → ∞ AND FIXED P T Considering the scenario with No Eve's CSI, the asymptotic SOP is given in the following corollary.
Corollary 3: When Eve's CSI is unavailable, the SOP under P J → ∞ and fixed P T can be approximated as
Proof: See Appendix C. Then, we consider the scenario with Eve's full CSI. According to (20) , following similar procedure as in the proof of Corollary 3, the asymptotic SOP with P J → ∞ and fixed P T for the scenario with Eve's full CSI is the same as that in equation (23) .
Remark 3: We observe that when P J → ∞, the asymptotic SOPs under the two considered scenarios are equal to the same nonzero constant, which indicates that the SOPs will not approach zero either even increasing transmit power of Charlie unboundedly. This is because that when the P J is large enough, the wiretap channel capacities almost decrease to zero and therefore the SOP is dictated to a large degree by the main channel condition.
D. EFFECTIVE SECRECY THROUGHPUT
The EST definition adopted in our paper corresponds to the average secrecy rate achieving a reliable and secure transmission at the destination, which is the product of the complementary probability of P out (R S ) and the predetermined secrecy rate R S [39] , [40] . It quantifies the average rate of the messages that are sent from the transmitter to the legitimate user securely [41] . Mathematically, the EST is given by
where * ∈ {I, II}. Remark 4: Given the results of (24), we numerically find that if R S is small, the EST is small; if R S is large, the complementary probability of P out (R S ) will be close to zero and therefore the value of EST remains small. So it is practical significant for designers to determine an optimal value of target secrecy rate, R opt S , which achieves the maximum EST.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, Monte Carlo simulation results are provided to validate theoretical analysis derived in the previous sections. Without loss of generality, we assume that the noise variances are σ 2 B = σ 2 E = 1. In each figure, the theoretical curves match precisely with the Monte Carlo simulations, which confirms the accuracy of our derivations. Fig. 2 depicts the SOP versus the transmit SNR γ B . As illustrated, the SOP of the network first decreases and then reaches an error floor with increasing γ B , which confirms the asymptotic analytical results in Section III. This is due to the fact that any increasing in the transmit power is beneficial for both the receiver and eavesdropper. Fig. 3 depicts the SOP of the network versus γ J . It is observed that the SOP decreases rapidly with increasing γ J . In addition, when γ J is higher than 35dB, the SOPs under the two considered scenarios almost reach the same error floor, which confirms the asymptotic analytical results in Section III. This is because the wiretap channel capacities under the tow considered scenarios all almost decrease to zero when γ J is in high regime. So the SOPs are dictated to a large degree by the main channel condition under this situation. This reveals that when γ J is higher than 35dB, even increasing the transmit power of Charlie will not benefit the improvement of secrecy performance under the considered network parameters. Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 present the SOP versus the number of transmitter's antennas N T and the number of cooperative jammer's antennas N J , respectively. As observed in the figures, the secrecy performance of the network is improved significantly when N T or N J increases. It indicates that increasing the number of transmitter's antennas or cooperative jammer's antennas is an effective method to enhance the secrecy performance of the considered network. Fig. 6 plots the EST versus the secrecy transmission rate R S . It is observed that the EST first increases and then decreases as R S increases, which reveals that there exists an optimum secrecy transmission rate R opt S that yields the maximum EST. This is consistent with the Remark 4. Moreover, we observe that the network can get higher EST by increasing N T or N J , while R opt S shifts to the right. This reveals that the network is capable of supporting a larger secure transmission rate when transmitter or cooperative jammer can accommodate a larger number of antennas under the considered network parameters. Fig. 2-6 show that when Eve's full CSI is available, the SOP of the considered network is lower than that under the scenario with No Eve's CSI, which is consistent with the Remark 1 in Section III. This is due to the fact that the isotropic AN scheme explored at cooperative jammer does not impose eavesdropping constraints.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigate the secure transmission for DQSM with AN in MISO wiretap networks, where a cooperative jammer deliberately interfere with the eavesdropper's reception. We derived exact and asymptotic closed-form expressions for the secrecy outage probability and the effective secrecy throughput to evaluate the secrecy performance of the considered network. Our results reveal that the secrecy performance of the system can be improved by increasing the transmit power of transmitter or cooperative jammer, but too large transmit power is not helpful. Moreover, increasing the number of antennas at the transmitter or cooperative jammer brings up better secrecy performance. In addition, when the eavesdropper's CSI is available, the system's secrecy performance is better than that under the scenario with no Eve's CSI.
APPENDIX A
When Eve's CSI is unavailable, the signals received by Bob and Eve during the duration of tth transmitter block are VOLUME 7, 2019 respectively given by
The received SINR at Bob and Eve can be derived as
Because only one entry in any column or any row of S * t , * ∈ [ , ] is nonzero, and the real and imaginary parts of the signal constellation symbol are assumed to have equal energy, so we have
By substituting (29) into (27) , and (30) into (28), respectively, (4) and (5) can be derived, which completes our proof.
APPENDIX B
Substituting y = ργ E N T γ J t in Equation (18), we have
When P T → ∞, we have γ B → ∞ and γ E → ∞, then
And 1 can be approximated as
Now, inserting (32) and (33) into (31) and performing some mathematical manipulations utilizing [28, eq. (9.211.4)], approximative SOP under the scenario with No Eve's CSI can be derived, which completes our proof.
APPENDIX C
According to (31) , when P J → ∞, we have γ J → ∞, then
By substituting (34) and (35) 
When γ J → ∞, we have
Now, inserting (37) 
